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Chapter 10 
Risk-taking of European banks in CEECs: the role of national 
culture  and stake vs shareholder view 
 
 
Federica Sist and Panu Kalmi 
 
 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
Since the time the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) opened their markets 
to accept foreign owners for banks, starting the processes of privatization and 
internationalization (through inflows), the European bank system evolved by considering 
new strategies, in relation to this openness, above other forces as competition, crises, 
regulation, innovation and so on. 
 In literature, it is not yet entirely clear why European banks decided go to CEECs. 
Explanations of this phenomenon can be found in excessive domestic competition 
(Andries, Capraru, 2012), clients support during the internationalization process, or simply 
presence in new countries to ride the wave of competitors. Anyway, the number of foreign 
owners in these countries has increased and studies on performance or efficiency 
demonstrate different results, though only the results on the importance of CEECs for the 
establishment of foreign branches, subsidiaries and strategic acquisitions in the banking 
and economic systems are shared in the literature. Starting from the interaction between 
the current literature on risk culture in banks and the strand of research on 
internationalization in the transition economy, where the issue of risk is more relevant than 
in other contexts, we develop a study focused on the influence of national culture on bank 
risk-taking.  
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The national culture is measured by Hofstede (2001) by six dimensions: power 
distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and 
indulgence. Not all dimensions are used at the same time in the financial sector. 
This study aims to understand the impact of national culture on risk-taking by 
European banks investing in CEECs. In addition, we inquire about the ownership effect 
(shareholders or stakeholder owned banks). In a further index we include concerns on the 
level of reform developed to account for country institution development in countries in 
transition. These elements and results contribute to the completion of the European context 
for the understanding of the banking system, revealing the internationalization behaviour 
of these types of financial institutions and giving the opportunity to make policy decisions 
or strategies concerning internationalization issues and bank regulations, especially for 
banking union goals and financial system integration. Our contribution to the literature 
serves as, to the best of our knowledge, the first study with an analysis of national culture 
and risk-taking of banks by ownership in CEECs, while other studies considered risk and 
internationalization from different points of view (Berger et al. 2015; Goetz et al. 2016; 
Ellul and Yeramilli, 2013;). Practitioners too will gain benefits from this work in their 
decision-making and planning strategies abroad. 
This study elaborates the intersection of the studies on the relationship of national 
culture and risk-taking in corporations (Li et al. 2013, Mihet, 2013) and the studies on risk-
taking in banks (Bhagat et al. 2015; Buch and De Long, 2008). We regress risk-taking, the 
dependent variable, with two dimensions of national culture variables, the independent 
variables, to find if they affect risk in some direction. The control variables related to the 
banks and the country variables are necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of regression; 
two variables are about the countries, and the others give information on the bank itself. 
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This study is outlined as follows: First, there is a literature review that begins to 
establish a relation between national culture and financial systems, continuing with the risk 
argument linked to internationalized banks or firms and dimensions used to measure 
national culture. Second, the session data, the methodology and variables are described. 
Finally, the results are explained and discussed, and conclusions are drawn. 
 
10.2 Literature review 
The dimensions of National Culture (NC) affect the financial system mechanisms in 
different ways. The preference toward banks rather than stock markets of a country depends 
on higher uncertainty-avoidance (Kwok, Tadesse 2006). Aggarwall and Goodell (2010) 
confirm and reinforce this result adding the inquiry of individualism and power distance, 
which imply a predilection for equity markets when their levels are high. Individualism is 
conducive to long-term financing of growing firms in market-based systems (Lee, Peterson 
2000). Individualism is relevant for the firm growth in the presence of financial constraints; 
in fact, when individualism is high, the obstacles are overcome through the ability of the 
entrepreneur or manager in relation to the bank (Boubakri, Saffar 2016), while the power 
distance is negatively related with growth, as a complement to previous results. It is clear 
the NC affects the behaviour of operators and the approach of financing firms; it reflects 
an evident importance of the NC for operators as well as for banks and their risk, especially 
if the bank internationalises. The expansion in other markets requires the management of 
the differences between countries of origin and destination, as well as tailored strategies to 
arrange the business model and successful elements to survive the internationalization 
process: all these aspects make the risk evaluation of operations and financial services 
supply more complex.  
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The geographic expansion of banks mitigates risk, not through the impact of loan 
quality, but by decreasing idiosyncratic local risk (Goetz et al. 2016, Akhigbe, Whyte 
2003). Choi et al. (2010) find that the cross-border M&As drive to a stabilization of 
earnings, even if Buch and De Long already in 2008 noted the reduction of risk in banks 
by acquiring foreign banks. 
While the method of going abroad is an interesting topic, other relevant features can 
impact the risk of multinational banks, such as the distance of the country of destination 
from the country of origin and the levels of the dimensions of NC in the two countries. 
CEECs are facing a change in their financial systems and banking structures, while 
the internationalization process has made an improvement in bank performance. The 
existing works in this context isolate different results between old and new Europe, likely 
according to the differences between these two areas. The liberalization process proceeds, 
and it is not taken for granted that the inflows will continue; in fact, the quality of market 
discipline can refuse foreign banks (Bertus et al. 2008).  
 
In literature, national culture is used to evaluate the risk-seeking of firms, in fact, 
the behaviour of multinationals depends even upon the decisions made according to the 
cultural background of the employees within the firm. In banks too, decisions are affected 
by the national culture of the organization and managers (Carretta, Farina and Schwizer 
2010); ownership is another important factor to understand the likelihood to prefer risky 
strategies (Mihet, 2013). The risk appetite should determine the choice of the country of 
destination since studies in this topic observe an impact of cultural characteristics in risk-
taking. Nonetheless, the Western European banks active in CEECs have an effectiveness 
culture of risk if they are efficient and not too risky during the time. NC is determinant in 
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risk choices in going abroad first (way and destination) and in how supply services after. 
The observation of risk-taking allows us to understand if the risk culture of the Western 
European banks internationalized in those countries has encouraged more risk-taking, and 
if we find differences between the groups: Stakeholder Value (STV) and Shareholder Value 
(SHV). 
 The studies on risk culture in the banking system are few and they require going in 
deep on the cultural side because one of several variables can affect risk-taking in 
determining the riskiness of the bank itself. Even if the banks are treated as enterprises, we 
have to remember their particularly strategic double role of transferring financial flows and 
serving as an instrument for political economy. When they develop their own business, 
they cannot assume all of the risks as in entrepreneurship activity; this is the reason why 
risk-taking is a relevant topic. The escalation of consciousness of risk to reason as an 
enterprise, in this type of financial institution, implies constant attention to changes and 
evolution of regulation. In fact, from this view they take entrepreneurship risk above the 
typical risk of their own businesses. The internationalization process is a particularly risky 
activity, especially in transition economies, but in the current global world it is a necessary 
choice that has to be arranged coherently with the other strategies and its own model (Ferri 
et al. 2015). One issue that has been studied less often is the impact of the ownership 
structure of the parent bank on the behaviour of the daughter bank. Cooperative banks have 
been shown to take much less risk than profit-maximizing banks (Hesse, Cihak, 2007). 
However, it is not clear whether this finding extends to the daughter banks of cooperative 
groups.  
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 The individualism and power distance are the two dimensions of NC in which we 
are interested. The first is more commonly used as an independent variable in finance and 
it always returns significant results, the meaning varies on the aim of the author, so in Li et 
al. (2013) it predicts the rule of law, in Mihet (2013) it is the mirror of the decisions made 
by overconfidence and over-optimism (Ashraf et al. 2016). Instead, Boubakri and Saffar 
(2016) believe the ability to overcome financial constraints is approximated by 
individualism itself. If individualism is positively related with risk-taking, in previous 
studies, we must predict a movement in the same direction, but it is necessary to remember 
the banks analysed in this study are in a non-developed context with a banking structure 
not completely reformed, where results are not always aligned with other contexts.  
 
HYP 1 Risk-taking of banks in CEECs increases if Individualism increases in the 
same geographic area. 
 
Power distance is basic for the culture of risk; when this dimension is high, the 
decisions are made without an effective comparison between levels (Ashraf et al. 2016). 
The bottom-up process in assessing the environment is not applied because the 
communication channel is always vertical, but top-down (Boubakri and Saffar, 2016). The 
culture of risk in the Bank Holding Company (BHC) is imposed in an authoritarian manner 
and the subsidiaries and branches lose autonomy (regardless if they keep the BHC’s model 
or not). Reasoning in a prudential way strictly compliant with procedure and without taking 
riskier decisions (Mihet 2013) restrains risk. This compliance with guidelines of the mother 
bank inhibits banks with high levels of power distance to take more risk. 
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HYP 2 Risk-taking of banks in CEECs decreases if the Power distance increases in 
the same geographic area. 
 
For European cooperatives can be affected from different features of the countries 
in which they operate (Fiordelisi, Mare 2014). The two models, SHV and STV, are 
compatible both with non-collectivism (Ferri, Leogrande 2015), so any ownership effect 
in terms of different models is awaited. If HYP3 is true, the risk culture of BHCs is 
indifferent in evaluating the risk-taking of their daughters in countries where reform of 
banking structure is not complete.  
 
 HYP 3 The banks that are owned by shareholders are related to risk-taking with the 
same sign of banks with stakeholders holding. 
 
10.3 Methodology  
The national culture is measured by Hofstede (2001) in six dimensions: power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and indulgence. 
The scores assigned are in a range of 0 to 100, and in our sample, the measure can vary 
from 20 to 80 for Individualism with a mean of 44, while power distance is from 40 to 100 
and the mean is 73; therefore, CEECs are not very individualistic and have a strong 
presence of hierarchical mechanisms.  
 
Risk-taking measures can express the overall risk taken through the volatility of 
bank earnings (Std(ROA), with normalized ROA). In fact, a shared belief is that volatile 
earnings are the consequence of risky operations (John et al. 2008; Zhang, 2009) and the 
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risk embodied in long-term investment results from R&D investments (R&D expenses to 
capitalization) (Li et al. 2013). Mihet (2013) includes the z-score of each firm, and it is 
therefore interesting to evaluate the risk-taking of banks through z-scores (Ashraf et al. 
2016; Bhagat et al. 2015; Berger et al. 2015; Mihet 2013) as well. Z_score is calculated as 
Z = (ROA + CAR)/σ (ROA), where ROA is earnings before taxes and loan loss provision 
divided by assets, CAR is the capital-asset ratio, and σ (ROA) is the standard deviation of 
the ROA over the entire sample period. The Z statistic indicates the number of standard 
deviations that a firm’s losses (negative profits) can increase to deplete equity, making the 
firm insolvent (De Nicolo` 2000). 
 
The other measures considered in banking are: distance to default and measures 
related to the stock market as bond yield spreads, volatility of bank stock returns and the 
variance of BHC’s stock returns (Goetz et al. 2016, Choi et al. 2010; Buch and DeLong 
2008); however, in this study we cannot use these types of variables. 
 
The ownership measure is, as usual, a dummy to isolate the model of banks or the 
ownership of CEECs, thus we analyse: the banks owned by Western European BHCs, in 
turn grouped into STV and SHV to capture different results by models, and banks with 
Eastern European owners, in turn separated into the state-owned banks and branches and 
subsidiaries owned by private BHC formed CEECs. The crisis years are always isolated 
through the dummy: equal to 0 if until the year 2008 is excluded, 1 otherwise. 
The data to measure the risk-taking are from Bankscope, and national culture data 
are from the website managed by Hofstede. The sample is composed of 328 Eastern 
European banks in 13 countries. Table 1 presents the summary of variables of banks 
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considered in the model, while table 2 to table 2.d show the variables explanatory of  
financial structure in CEECs, both by all banks and groups studied. 
 
To evaluate the effects of culture on risk-taking through we use the unobservable 
individual effects, while ordinary least squares (OLS) or general linear models (GLS) are 
not applicable because of the characteristics of the data set, some authors overcome this 
argument through the hierarchical linear mixed model. When the variables to be checked 
are not several, there are other solutions to avoid collinearity. The data set is panel data, 
and the scores of national culture are time invariant as to years and they change country by 
country. The individuals (the banks) are not observable, so the problems of multi-
collinearity are solved through the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator for error-component 
models: 
 
𝑦௜௧ = 𝑋ଵ௜௧𝛽ଵ +  𝑋ଶ௜௧𝛽ଶ +  𝑍ଵ௜𝛿ଵ +  𝑍ଶ௜𝛿ଶ + 𝜇௜ + 𝜀௜௧ 
 
We create four different vectors, grouping different types of variables present in the 
panel and the 𝜇௜ (mu) catches the error-in-time invariant variables and all those variables 
with problems of endogeneity.  
𝜇௜ is the unobserved, panel-level random effect that is assumed to have a zero mean 
and finite variance 𝜎ఓଶ and to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over the 
panels. 
𝜀௜௧ is the idiosyncratic error that is assumed to have a zero mean and finite variance 
𝜎ఓଶ and to be i.i.d. over all of the observations in the data. 𝑦௜௧is the z_score. 
 
 10
The time-varying variables are assigned at two different vectors: 𝑋ଵ௜௧ (GDP per 
capita) with exogeneity, uncorrelated with 𝜇௜ , variables and 𝑋ଶ௜௧  (size, EBRD score of 
banking sector liberalization: banre_intr, NIM) embodies the endogenous variables, likely 
correlated with 𝜇௜ . Both 𝑍ଵ௜  (Power distance) and 𝑍ଶ௜  (NC_Indiv) contain the time-
invariant variables assumed to be exogenous in the first vector and endogenous in the 
second.  
 The firm-level control variables are connected through z-scores, so size is always 
in positive relation with the z-scores. If it is confirmed, it will reinforce the results linked 
to the hypotheses, as the movement of NIM that should be in the same direction of the 
dependent variable. The country-level control variables are two dimensions: GDP per 
capita, often used for these types of studies, and the level of progress of reforms in the 
banking sector, used for CEECs.  
 
 
Table 1. Summary of variables used in the model  
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     z_score |      1595    16.01641    10.87427   3.567408     46.737 
NC_Pdistance |      1995    72.62306    15.55823         40        100 
    NC_Indiv |      1995    43.68872    18.38581         20         80 
        size |      1995     6.91004    1.692859  -1.811461   10.77817 
         NIM |      1595    4.236772    1.515132   2.046841   8.894008 
   GDPcapita |      1595    1.26e+11    1.30e+11   4.60e+09   5.20e+11 
banre_intr~i |      1823    3.423884    .4361299       2.33          4 
 
Note: See table 5 for variable descriptions 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of key variables of the banking sector in CEECs 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      assets |      1995    3377.531    6065.817   .1634152   47962.31 
       tier1 |       787    15.13861    10.88371      -15.9     211.65 
       loans |      1985    2028.211    3714.923   .3269652   35503.71 
tot_deposits |      1987    2683.735    4874.874   .6617425   37805.25 
         NIM |      1595    4.236772    1.515132   2.046841   8.894008 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         cir |      1985    75.68506    61.64965      1.023     884.64 
intexp_int~b |      1870    3.696139    6.295207        .12     265.58 
         obs |      1946    668.4126    3782.901  -840.5334   150318.4 
 NPR_grloans |      1207    11.06424    11.90601          0       95.9 
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Table 2.a Summary of key variables of the banking sector in CEECs by WE SHV-
owned banks 
 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      assets |       802     4183.59    6601.572   .1634152   38162.05 
       tier1 |       356    15.53166    8.108962      -15.9      49.58 
       loans |       797    2546.199      3870.4   .5008638   24401.61 
tot_deposits |       796    3350.626    5353.323   .6617425   30924.05 
         NIM |       660    4.262956    1.492512   2.046841   8.894008 
         cir |       797    71.79923    59.84503      1.023     884.64 
intexp_int~b |       755    3.855775    9.677528        .12     265.58 
         obs |       802     1036.34    5761.557  -840.5334   150318.4 
 NPR_grloans |       506     9.72915    11.03826          0       95.9 
 
Table 2.b Summary of key variables of the banking sector in CEECs by WE STV-
owned banks 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      assets |       346    4262.808    6067.896   10.67072   36608.42 
       tier1 |       146    13.92555    6.666122       2.87      38.83 
       loans |       343    2506.994    3343.106   .3269652   18728.11 
tot_deposits |       345    3454.084    4989.797   4.893097   30073.18 
         NIM |       279     4.07165    1.398791   2.191172   8.894008 
         cir |       346     74.7605    44.22733     18.411    594.361 
intexp_int~b |       323    3.195139    1.569714        .67      10.67 
         obs |       338    601.1758    900.4724  -4.77e-12   4403.426 
 NPR_grloans |       228    9.929342    8.056575        .14      43.05 
 
 
Table 2.c Summary of key variables of the banking sector in CEECs by State-owned 
banks 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      assets |       169    4447.783    8952.428   32.26458   47962.31 
       tier1 |        66      14.815    9.914078       4.88      61.02 
       loans |       169    2807.037    6414.188   3.235355   35503.71 
tot_deposits |       169    3434.962    7091.656    10.2751   37805.25 
         NIM |       130    4.703612    1.838574   2.191172   8.894008 
         cir |       167    82.01796    57.48072     20.058    656.757 
intexp_int~b |       163    3.873558    2.188537        .61      19.81 
         obs |       159    611.8854    1753.079  -3.64e-11   10736.34 
 NPR_grloans |       100     15.8726    13.83666       1.84      87.61 
 
 
Table 2.d Summary of key variables of the banking sector in CEECs by EE-owned 
banks 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      assets |       626    2030.944    5230.751     12.636   47962.31 
       tier1 |       230    15.36404    16.43211        .43     211.65 
       loans |       624    1252.566    3693.227   3.235355   35503.71 
tot_deposits |       625    1590.687    4139.692   4.213787   37805.25 
         NIM |       483    4.275123    1.649136   2.046841   8.894008 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         cir |       621    83.27241    76.61524     17.749    767.474 
intexp_int~b |       587    3.808211    1.837746        .45      19.81 
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         obs |       585    266.9828    965.2261  -3.64e-11   10736.34 
 NPR_grloans |       372    12.49046    12.37909          0      87.61  
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10.4 Results 
The hypotheses about the relation between risk-taking and NC dimensions are significantly 
confirmed; when individualism and / or power distance increase, the z-score decreases, the 
HYP1 is confirmed. The NIM and size have a positive relation with the z-score; these 
variables are firm-specific control variables and the coefficients have a predictable sign 
because NIM is an item related to ROA, and we thus have a corroboration of the 
effectiveness of the estimation run. The coefficient of the variable on liberalization of the 
banking sector too has a rational sign; in fact, when the liberalization and privatization level 
of a country is increasing, the stability decreases at the beginning as a result of enhanced 
regulation (Table 3). 
Table 3 shows, of course, that the crisis dummy moves in the same direction as the 
z-score. 
 
 
Table 3 Hausman-Taylor estimation with dummies 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     z_score |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TVexogenous  | 
   GDPcapita |  -6.16e-12   2.45e-12    -2.52   0.012    -1.10e-11   -1.37e-12 
 stakev_bank |   1.904962   .7853236     2.43   0.015     .3657562    3.444168 
 sharev_bank |   .7231638    .627016     1.15   0.249    -.5057649    1.952093 
  state_bank |   1.554086   .8478517     1.83   0.067    -.1076728    3.215845 
   eeuropown |  -.7783234   .7034166    -1.11   0.269    -2.156995    .6003478 
      crisis |   2.400212   .2088165    11.49   0.000     1.990939    2.809485 
TVendogenous | 
        size |   .7811133   .2126951     3.67   0.000     .3642386    1.197988 
banre_intr~i |  -1.373114   .3950847    -3.48   0.001    -2.147465   -.5987618 
         NIM |   1.359002   .1204251    11.29   0.000     1.122973    1.595031 
TIexogenous  | 
NC_Pdistance |   -.458656   .1195363    -3.84   0.000    -.6929429   -.2243691 
TIendogenous | 
    NC_Indiv |  -.4414989   .1077359    -4.10   0.000    -.6526574   -.2303404 
             | 
       _cons |   61.60424   12.93378     4.76   0.000      36.2545    86.95399 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  13.501973 
     sigma_e |  2.7066679 
         rho |  .96136646   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: TV refers to time varying; TI refers to time invariant. 
Hausman-Taylor estimation: xthtaylor z_score $xvars $dummies, constant (NC_Pdistance NC_Indiv) endog(NC_Indiv size 
banre_intrali NIM) 
 15
global xvars NC_Pdistance NC_Indiv size NIM GDPcapita banre_intrali; global dummies stakev_bank sharev_bank 
state_bank eeuropown crisis; Number of obs = 1461; Group variable: id_bank, Number of groups = 271, Obs per group: min 
= 1, avg = 5.4, max = 10, Random effects u_i ~ i.i.d. Wald chi2(10) = 321.89, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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 In particular, the stakeholders valued banks (cooperative and saving owned banks), 
and state owned banks are related to the z-score in a positive, statistically significant way. 
Banks of Eastern European holdings have shown negative signs even if it is non-
statistically significant. Thus, we can assert that the foreign owned banks are negatively 
related to risk-taking, especially if the holdings are cooperatives or savings. 
 In Table 4, the effect of crisis is investigated and any impact of crisis is indicated; 
the directions of relations are confirmed if compared with the previous results. 
 
 
Table 4 Hausman-Taylor estimation by period of crisis 
 
Z_score 
Years< 2008* Years>2008** 
Coeff P>|z| Coeff P>|z| 
GDPcapita 1.19e-11    0.012  5.03e-12 0.019 
size .8339045    0.005  .2686516 0.192 
banre_intr~i -2.222979    0.000 -1.601133 0.000 
NIM  1.014647    0.000  .9858797 0.000 
NC_Pdistance -.5841814    0.000 -.6330776 0.000 
NC_Indiv -.5806055    0.000 -.6602032 0.000 
*xthtaylor z_score $xvars, constant(NC_Pdistance NC_Indiv) endog(NC_Indiv size banre_intrali NIM), if crisis==1; Number of obs = 
736; Number of groups = 221; Obs per group: min = 1; avg = 3.3; max = 4; Wald chi2(5) = 159.79; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; sigma_u => 
14.139543; sigma_e => 1.0554782 
**xthtaylor z_score $xvars, constant(NC_Pdistance NC_Indiv) endog(NC_Indiv size banre_intrali NIM), if crisis==0; Number of obs = 
725; Number of groups = 212; Obs per group: min = 1; avg = 3.4; max = 6; Random effects u_i ~ i.i.d. Wald chi2(5) = 76.62; Prob > 
chi2 = 0.0000; sigma_u => 11.579777; sigma_e => 2.3533713 
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Table 5 Description of variables  
 
Variables  Description  
Z_score 
Z = (ROA + CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is earnings before taxes and loan loss provision divided by assets, CAR 
is the capital-asset ratio, and σ (ROA) is the standard deviation of the ROA over the entire sample period. The Z 
statistic indicates the number of standard deviations that a firm’s losses (negative profits) can increase to deplete 
equity, making the firm insolvent (De Nicolo` 2000). 
  
GDPcapita It compares GDP on a purchasing power parity basis divided by population as of 1 July for the same year. 
size Ln(Total asset)  
NIM Net interest margin (%) 
crisis Dummy variable, 0 if year<2008, 1 otherwise 
State_banks dummy variable, owned by the state 
Sharev_bank dummy variable, largest owner Western European shareholder bank 
Stakev_bank dummy variable, largest owner Western European savings or a cooperative bank 
eeuropown dummy variable, largest owner Eastern European bank 
banre_intr~i 
1 Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system. 
2 Significant liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed credit or interest rate 
ceilings. 
3 Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential supervision and 
regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to cheap refinancing; significant lending to 
private enterprises and significant presence of private banks. 
4 Significant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards; well-functioning banking 
competition and effective prudential supervision; significant term lending to private enterprises; substantial 
financial deepening. 
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of banking laws and 
regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of competitive banking services. “+” and “-” ratings are treated 
by adding 0.33 and subtracting 0.33 from the full value. Averages are obtained by rounding down, for example. a 
score of 2.6 is treated as 2+, but a score of 2.8 is treated as 3-. 
NC_Pdistance The extent to which less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally (Hofstede 2001)  
NC_Indiv 
A society in which the ties between individuals are loose. Everyone is expected to look after himself and his 
immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into 
strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede 2001)  
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10.5 Conclusion 
Building a new body of literature about risk culture is necessary to achieve the analysis of 
the determinants of risk-taking. In intermediation activities, the national culture can explain 
the success of operations abroad, but financial and economic results too, where banks are 
strongly related to the risk taken. The issue of risk is fundamental in multinational banks 
and the country of destination features an impact on risk for the branch or subsidiary, 
especially in terms of culture. 
 
Individualism and power distance affect significantly the risk-taking measured by 
z-score. The same direction of individualism and risk-taking can be explained by the 
probable presence of financial constraints, that implies a greater relation between people 
during the negotiation and the increase of the presence of relationships in banking. Low 
levels of collectivism imply absolutely more negotiation, bringing to a more argued 
granting of loans, but not necessary well informed of relative risk. The direct relation of 
the bank with a manager or entrepreneur should force the assignment of the loan 
independently of the actual project risk.  
 
From the point of view of branches and subsidiaries, we find lower risk-taking if 
the power distance dimension is low. When the autonomy of daughter banks is lesser, as 
in the case of higher-level power distance, the procedures to assess the risk to be taken are 
less flexible, behaving at a lower level of risk or at least the risk required by BHC.  
 
The control variables give reasonable signs, for example the positive relation of the 
EBRD index, that means the level of reform to liberalize, privatize and regulate the banking 
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sector in CEECs increases, at least initially, inducing instability. This result suffers the 
limits of the measure we used as proxy of risk-taking. The coefficient of the size is positive 
as usual.  
 
The results on SHV and STV suggest that banks with cooperative BHCs in CEECs 
have the same behaviour as commercial banks in facing cultural characteristics of a host 
country; it can likely be caused by the homogenous instability of CEECs submitted to 
constant reforms. 
 
The results obtained by this study help regulators to consider the different models 
in daughters’ banks operating globally and professionals to plan risk management and 
internationalization activities due to the analysis of NC in the country of destination. The 
contribution we make is to build the literature around the relevant topic of risk culture in 
banks, especially in terms of internationalization.  
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